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Abstract 
After years of declining membership, and in the wake of a general election in which it recorded its 
lowest share of the popular vote since 1983, the Labour party is again attempting to attract new 
members.  This is not, of course, the first time that Labour has attempted to re-create a mass-
membership. New Labour deployed many of the same techniques between 1994 and 1997. This 
article both assesses the extent of the current membership crisis and explores that earlier 
experience. We outline the basis of Tony Blair’s initiative in recruiting new members during the 
1990s and detail the extent of the decline in membership after 1997. We examine the state of the 
party’s membership currently and go on to consider the lessons for the party today both of New 
Labour’s initial success in attracting new members and of its ultimate failure to retain them. 
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In the September 2010 Labour leadership contest, nearly 180,000 ballot papers were distributed to 
individual members of the party. The figure suggested a dramatic rise in party membership since the 
general election defeat of May 2010, one that continued in the first months of Ed Milband’s 
leadership of the party. In its annual report Labour published a membership figure of 193,961 for 
December 2010, up from 156,205 a year previously. However, this striking rise in the party’s 
individual membership came after more than a decade in which it had fallen continuously. By 2009, 
it was under 40 per cent of what it had been when Labour was elected to office in May 1997. Such a 
decline was all the more noteworthy, of course, because back in the mid-1990s developing a mass 
membership base was taken to be a defining feature of New Labour, one that was intimately 
associated with Tony Blair’s leadership of the party and with techniques pioneered in Sedgefield, his 
parliamentary constituency in the North-East of England. Between 1994 and 1997 membership had 
increased spectacularly, reaching just over four hundred thousand, but thereafter the party had 
proved unable to hold onto its membership. Moreover, the increase since May 2010 does not 
appear to have been sustained. By December 2011, the party stated that membership had fallen 
slightly to 193,300. Reports of the number of ballots distributed for internal party elections in the 
summer of 2012 indicate a much more substantial decline of nearly 10 per cent in around six months 
(Black, 2012). 
 
In this article we examine the state of Labour’s membership. It is a commonplace observation in the 
press and in academic research that, given the years of decline and notwithstanding the recent rise, 
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it is in crisis. We assess the extent of that crisis. Unlike previous scholarship by Patrick Seyd and Paul 
Whiteley detailing the state of the party’s grassroots (the classic texts are 1992 and 2002), we do not 
have access to data concerning the activism of members. Instead we draw on four distinct sources of 
information to chart developments in the membership of the party. First, we deploy the 
extraordinarily detailed breakdown of voting by individual party members in the 2010 Labour party 
leadership election to consider the distribution and size of membership on a constituency by 
constituency basis in September 2010. This data has the advantage that, not being based on a 
survey, they offer a revealing picture of the precise state of Labour’s grassroots. Second, using the 
party’s annual report, we extract information to chart the flow of membership over the last twenty 
years. Where possible we examine the turnover, taking account not just of those joining but of those 
leaving . It is well established that party-generated figures may exaggerate membership levels (see 
Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 6-7; and Scarrow, 2000, 85, 88-89). By charting the flow of members 
across years, at the same time as noting changes to the means of calculation, we hope to minimise 
this risk. Third, we draw on data discussed by the party’s National Executive Committee (as 
documented in the form of blogs) to examine the fluctuations in membership. A fourth strand of 
data in the form of press reports allows us to look at the rise and fall of party membership in two 
constituencies, Sedgefield and Dunfermline East. Manifestly, both blogs and press reports are 
potentially problematic as sources. Nevertheless, these two CLPs are especially important to any 
discussion because they were held up as stories of model success – the parliamentary seats of Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown, two key architects of developing Labour into a mass membership 
organisation during the mid-1990s. The extent of press coverage of the Sedgefield model especially 
provides us with an opportunity to assess the initiative. 
 
Drawing on these distinct sources of data, we address a number of related issues concerning the 
state of Labour party membership and its apparent recovery since May 2010. We ask what was the 
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extent of the fall in grassroots’ numbers after the 1997 election victory? Where possible, we address 
potential reasons for the collapse in the party’s membership. We detail the state of Labour 
membership at the time of the 2010 leadership contest and we consider what the data reveals about 
the party’s members in contrast to earlier work by, among others, Seyd and Whiteley. In our 
conclusion we discuss the importance for Labour politics of these developments, noting a number of 
recurring problems that the party has encountered. In our analysis, we do not offer a specific 
hypothesis or suggest a single causal relationship that might explain the fall in membership. Rather, 
our aim is to take the detailed evidence about membership changes and consider what conclusions 
might be generated.  
 
In themselves, these issues are of significance, but there is, of course, a wider dimension to this 
analysis. Labour is not alone as a party in experiencing declining levels of membership. Over several 
decades, party membership has fallen across most European polities (see Scarrow, 2000; Seyd and 
Whiteley, 2004, 356; and Webb, 2002, 441). More than a decade ago, Peter Mair and Ingrid van 
Biezen (2001) charted the absolute drop in members, alongside the relative decline in party 
membership as a proportion of the electorate. A second paper, coauthored with Thomas Poguntke, 
confirmed the pattern, demonstrating the ‘staggering’ extent of the loss (van Biezen, Mair and 
Poguntke, 2012, 33). But the British case was especially precipitous as all three major parties lost 
members (Marshall, 2009). Between 1983 and 2008, the proportion of the electorate that was a 
member of these parties fell from 3.8 per cent to 1.2 per cent (Marshall, 2009, 6; Biezen, Mair and 
Poguntke, 2012, 28, 32). Only Slovakia and the Czech Republic indicated a greater decline in 
membership. By that date, only Poland and Latvia revealed a worse figure for party political 
engagement. In another analysis, the United Kingdom offered the lowest level of political 
participation (Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010, 825). Such statistics are all the more striking given that the 
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British decline comes in the face of a sustained initiative by Labour to regenerate its grassroots in the 
mid-1990s. 
 
Academics do not agree on quite why party membership has experienced such trouble. Comparative 
scholars note variation in terms of the historical entrenchment of a democracy and the size of a 
polity (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 9-10; and van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012, 36). Through 
their extensive surveys, Seyd and Whiteley (see, for example, 2004) came to emphasise choice based 
factors focused around the incentives that shaped an individual’s decision to participate. They 
downplayed structural factors such as societal trends. In more recent work, Paul Whiteley (2010) has 
distinguished between two broad perspectives (see also Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 14). Under the 
first approach, parties have been undermined by state interventions. Public authorities have 
undertaken more and more tasks traditionally the responsibility of parties. As a result, increasingly 
redundant, political activists have ceased to participate. Under such ‘state capture’, there is no 
demand for large memberships.  In the case of Britain, a strong statement is to be found in Mair’s 
analysis of New Labour as ‘partyless democracy’ (Mair, 2000; see also Mair, 1997). Under the second 
approach, parties have been undermined by more general changes to civil society that have shaped 
the supply of members. Such changes might include the rise of competing organisations, increased 
pressure on leisure time, and the changed social backgrounds of potential participants. Given the 
range of alternatives, there is less incentive for individuals to join a party. In this perspective, 
declining participation is reflective of a more general decline in social capital (the classic statement 
of this approach is, of course, Putnam, 2001). In a cross national survey, Whiteley’s conclusion 
indicated support for the former explanation. It is worth emphasising that, in this paper, our aim is 
not to test the conclusions of this comparative literature. Rather it is to use the available data to 
illuminate the case of the Labour party. Nevertheless, our analysis allows us to offer some reflections 
on these wider perspectives and we do address issues relevant to comparative discussion in our 
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conclusion. In the next section we discuss the foundation of the Sedgefield model of mass 
membership. 
 
II The ‘Sedgefield model’:  The importance of mass membership in New Labour 
Even before becoming party leader in July 1994, Tony Blair was closely associated with the need to 
increase the size of Labour’s local membership. In the early 1990s, dissatisfied with the extent of 
modernisation strategies elsewhere in the party, he helped to pioneer a number of schemes to 
boost recruitment in his Sedgefield constituency (see Rentoul 1995, 312-313; and Smyth 1996). An 
increased membership, one that was in some generalised sense different to past memberships, was 
a fundamental way of revitalising Labour. Blair told the BBC’s On the Record in January 1993, ‘What I 
want to see is the Labour party pushing itself outwards, getting back in its local community, being 
the party that represents people within that community’ (BBC On The Record 1993a). He continued 
‘it is so important that we go in a different direction on membership’, holding up Sedgefield as an 
exemplar of what could be achieved. For Blair, getting people to join was not just a statistical 
exercise, it was a means of recasting the party altogether. He told Brian Walden in September 1993, 
‘This mass membership – extending the membership of the party – that’s not a glorified recruitment 
drive to me, it’s about transforming the way the Labour party works and it operates and it thinks… 
We are changing the whole culture of the party and the way it works’ (Walden 1993; see also 
Timmins 1992). The development of a mass party was linked to reforms to Labour’s structure, in 
particular the establishment of one member, one vote, for internal posts and leadership election 
contests. The measure, it was argued, empowered members and encouraged participation. 
 
In a 1999 pamphlet for Progress, an internal group within Labour, Phil Wilson outlined the Sedgefield 
model in detail emphasising a focus on ‘traditional hard working communities’ (Wilson 1999, 5). He 
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noted, ‘Tony Blair believed that the party had to become less introspective and more community- 
focused, with a mass membership making it more representative’ (Wilson 1999, 6). For Blair, having 
a mass membership was a way of locating the party in the community and avoiding the extremism of 
the past which could be blamed, in part at any rate, on unrepresentative activists taking control. He 
concluded, ‘We have to represent communities and have roots in them’ (Hetherington 1994, 8). It 
was an important lesson to learn: Blair argued, ‘There is a slight tendency to take people’s votes for 
granted, to think an area like this [Sedgefield] is solid Labour.’ Sedgefield offered members the 
opportunity to pay what they could afford and replaced some party meetings with social occasions. 
When Blair was filmed eating a burger at a barbecue, one journalist commented ‘the scene gave a 
whole new meaning to the idea of a political party and was meant to’ (Aitken 1994, 27). Wilson 
made the point: ‘Political debate, socials and even barbecues were the order of the day’ (Wilson 
1999, 8).  
 
Blair was not alone in supporting such an initiative. An eloquent statement of the possibilities of 
developing a mass membership base was provided by Gordon Brown in a 1993 pamphlet, Making 
Mass Membership Work. This built on earlier work he had done for the Tribune group of MPs which  
had emphasised recruiting trade union levy payers – members of unions affiliated to Labour – into 
formal membership: ‘for this army of supporters now waiting in the wings’, he claimed, ‘individual 
membership should be inexpensive to buy and attractive to hold’ (Brown 1987). In the event the 
attempt to enrol trade unionists proved disappointing. In four years only 23,000 levy payers joined 
the party (Russell 2005, 218). By 1993, Brown was focusing on an active, directed recruitment 
strategy in the community. People should be asked to pay what they could afford (a central theme in 
Sedgefield’s experience) with local parties making up shortfalls through fundraising. He was blunt 
about the party’s existing culture: ‘We also need to address the fact that the style of our meetings 
has been a turn off for many members’ (Brown 1993, 6). Labour needed to locate itself within the 
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locality – ‘at the centre of community life’ and look out for ‘local issues to highlight’ (Brown 1993, 7). 
Members would be ‘two way ambassadors for Labour’ as ‘our party will reflect the communities that 
its members live in’ and he promised ‘an explosion of political involvement and community activity’ 
(Brown 1993, 8-9). Wilson argued that local policy forums might involve community groups (Wilson 
1999, 17). Brown subsequently picked up on this theme after he became leader of the party in 2007 
in a Progress pamphlet he wrote: ‘every local party should involve local organisations and individuals 
with our shared values in our debates’ (Brown 2007, 8). 
 
In similar vein to Blair, Brown drew on his experience in Dunfermline, telling John Humphreys, ‘in my 
constituency the membership’s trebled. If you go out and talk to people, if you get out and visit 
people, if you knock on doors and explain your message, people will join’ (BBC On The Record 
1993b). Personal contacts were vital. The experience of both Sedgefield and Dunfermline indicated 
there were many potential members ready to participate. Both were part of a series of pilot 
schemes that the NEC authorised in 1993. The Independent newspaper quoted Rita Taylor, the 
secretary of Sedgefield CLP, ‘There is no doubt there are literally hundreds of people out there 
wanting to join up. It is about involving the community in what happens’ (quoted by Pithers 1993, 6; 
see also Webster 1991; and Rentoul 1995, 313). Wilson too claimed that people were waiting to be 
asked to join (Wilson 1999, 8). In his pamphlet Brown maintained that the record in Dunfermline 
destroyed ‘the idea that mass membership is a romantic illusion’ (Brown 1993, 3). Years later Brown 
told a journalist, ‘I always thought that the party was too narrow in its membership, and its link with 
the communities it served. I thought that contributed to many of our problems, that we were talking 
to ourselves, rather than relating to the country’ (Hughes 1998, 6). 
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Accordingly, a mass party membership, one that was based in the community, was for Blair and 
Brown a central feature of New Labour. Wilson asserted, ‘The distinction between community and 
the Labour party was beginning to dissolve’ (Wilson 1999, 9). In his introduction to Wilson’s 
pamphlet, Blair was indignant in rejecting the charge that ‘New Labour is somehow a recent 
invention of a metropolitan elite, foisted on an unwilling party.’ Elsewhere he was equally 
categorical: ‘I see the Labour party here [Sedgefield] as the model of what the Labour party 
(nationally) should be’ (quoted by Smyth 1996, 63). Rentoul (1995, 312) noted, ‘There is a strong 
urge to be sceptical about the claims made for the Sedgefield Labour Party’ but he concluded that it 
was ‘a genuine success story’.  As James Purnell (2012, 94) put it recently, ‘New Labour was born 
there, in Trimdon [in Sedgefield], not in Islington.’ 
 
Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley gave academic support to initiatives aimed at boosting the number 
of individual members of the Labour party. From 1990 onwards, in a series of books and articles, 
based on extensive surveys, they gave a detailed account of who joined Labour in terms of their 
socio-economic background and political views (Seyd and Whiteley 1992). They developed a detailed 
theoretical account as to what motivated individuals to participate. Their ‘general incentives’ model 
combined a number of motivations including specific benefits – political (such as individual voting 
rights) and social – alongside a more solidaristic aspect. In its emphasis on a range of features, 
including the importance of a community base, it was compatible with Blair’s Sedgefield initiative.  
Most importantly of all perhaps, Seyd and Whiteley offered a persuasive and rigorous model, one at 
odds with the prevailing academic orthodoxy, which suggested that members helped to generate 
electoral support (see also Whiteley and Seyd 1992). The implication of such a conclusion was 
straightforward. After four successive general election defeats between 1979 and 1992, if Labour 
wanted to win office again, it needed to expand its membership base considerably (Seyd 1993, 100). 
Such a claim was not lost on the media where Seyd and Whiteley’s research was frequently 
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published and discussed (see, for example, Whiteley and Seyd 2000, 21; Whiteley and Seyd 2001, 
17). In later work they demonstrated the different characteristics of those who had joined since Blair 
became leader of the party: younger, more likely to be male and working class, working in the 
private sector, not in unions, and less partisan (Seyd and Whiteley 2002). They went on to chart a 
significant decline in activism both in long term members who were less participative than they had 
been and in the new members who were less engaged in party activities than more established 
participants (Seyd and Whiteley 2002; Whiteley and Seyd 2002). The finding was significant. Labour 
hoped that its new mass membership base would generate a sustained increase in party activism 
and in its level of electoral support. Manifestly, the continuing lack of grassroots activism threatened 
such goals. Of course, the agenda established by Seyd and Whiteley stood in contrast to the 
comparative research, noted earlier, which highlighted the difficulties political parties had in 
sustaining mass membership across a number of polities (Mair and van Biezen 2001). 
 
III The rise and fall of Labour party membership 
Figure 1 sets out the development of Labour party membership since 1981. Charting the pattern 
since the party’s foundation in 1900 is by no means straightforward (see Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 
13-14; Russell 2005, 216-219; see also Marshall 2009; and Tanner 2000). Formally, there was no 
individual membership until 1918 and figures were not published till 1928. After peaking at over one 
million in 1952, membership declined but the figures from the late-1950s to the end of the 1970s 
are inaccurate. When they reported figures in this period, local constituency parties had to affiliate a 
minimum of 800 members (from 1957), subsequently increased to 1,000 (in 1963). The minimum 
affiliations hid the extent of the collapse of party membership. In 1979, the affiliation level was 
abolished so from 1980 onwards the figures are, once again, more accurate. In the late 1980s, a 
national membership scheme was introduced to replace local organisation. Historically, little 
importance was given by the party leadership to the recruitment and retention of members. Indeed 
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for much of the period from the 1950s onwards, senior figures within Labour were of the view, 
backed by some scholarship, that in an era of national campaigning, widespread access to the media, 
and stable electoral alignments, party members were relatively unimportant. By the early 1990s 
membership had fallen further. 
 
Figure 1 Labour Party Membership, 1981-2011  
 
Sources: 1981-90: Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 16; 1991-2011: Labour party NEC, Annual Report 1990-
2012. 
 
Following Tony Blair’s election as leader in 1994 a sustained expansion of Labour’s membership took 
place. As well as benefiting from local strategies to target members, the party allocated considerable 
resources to recruitment at a national level in the form of advertisements and staff. Labour also 
benefited from an extremely favourable political climate in which the Conservative administration 
was exceptionally unpopular in the opinion polls. However, one commentator claimed that the 
direct recruitment of members through personal contacts was the most successful method of 
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increasing enrolment (Smyth 1996, 71). Peter Mandelson suggested 28 per cent of new recruits 
came through friends (Mandelson and Liddle 1996, 220). He commented, ‘recruiting new members 
has been the biggest organisational priority for the party’ (Mandelson and Liddle 1996, 218).  
 
A few months before the 1997 general election, in January 1997, Labour membership passed 
400,000 (Rentoul 1997, 6). But, far from sustaining this momentum and achieving the 500,000 plus 
target that had been set by Tony Blair, membership peaked soon after at around 405,000 and then 
started to decline (McSmith 1998, 4). Over the next twelve years the fall was steady. It was discussed 
at various points by the party, including at National Executive meetings, and the role of membership 
was the subject of a number of initiatives during Labour’s period in office: Partnership into Power, 
with a ‘healthy party taskforce’ under the MP Ian McCartney, was followed by A 21st Century Party 
(Macleod 1996, 6; and Watt 1998, 15). By the time of the latter scheme, McCartney claimed, rather 
optimistically given the data in table 1 below, ‘In the last few years we have spectacularly reversed 
many years of declining membership’, (Labour party 1999, 1). Elsewhere, however, he was quoted 
by The Times as complaining that Labour needed to find new ways to ‘involve members and engage 
with local communities’ (Baldwin and Webster 1999). Neither scheme came up with much by way of 
a solution as to how to recruit and retain members. John Denham, a Labour minister admitted later 
that there had been ‘a naïve optimism’ about party membership, which was in ‘a parlous state’ 
(Denham 2003, 301).  
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Table 1: Labour party membership 1989-2011 
Year Members Year on year 
change, % 
Year Members Year on year 
change, % 
1989 293,723  2001 272,000 -12.5 
1990 311,152 5.9 2002 248,294 -8.7 
1991 261,233 -16.0 2003 214,952 -13.4 
1992 279,530 7.0 2004 201,374 -6.3 
1993 266,270 -4.7 2005 198,026 -1.6 
1994 305,189 14.6 2006 182,370 -7.9 
1995 365,110 19.6 2007 176,891 -3.0 
1996 400,465 9.7 2008 166,247 -6.0 
1997 405,238 1.1 2009 156,205 -6.0 
1998 387,776 -4.3 2010 193,961 24.2 
1999 361,000 -6.9 2011 193,300 -0.3 
2000 311,000 -13.9 2012* 178,005 -8.6 
Source: 1998-2011 data taken from NEC, Annual Report 1990-2012 (occasionally authored as Labour 
party, Annual Report. In 2012, the party published a revised figure for 2010 of 193,261. *The 2012 
figure comes from an email circulated by Ann Black, 4 July 2012, which detailed the number of 
ballots distributed for internal party elections. 
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A number of points are worth noting from table 1 (see also figure 2 below). The dramatic increase in 
membership during 1994-1997 is apparent. That increase came after a number of years in which 
membership fluctuated. Of course, in any one year the net increase, or net fall for that matter, hides 
a larger shift as those joining are offset by some leaving and vice versa. Usually, Labour has not 
published these gross figures for recruitment. In 1991, 1992, 1993 and 2008 the party did give the 
full data. For 1991-93, these figures reveal the staggering extent of the membership crisis that 
confronted Labour by the time Blair became leader. Nearly 80,000 people left the party in 1991 
alone. In the following two years a further 70,000 departed. In both years the net effect was limited 
by a considerable number joining. In all, departures between those three years alone represented 
nearly 50 per cent of the 1990 total. Of course there may be some double counting in these figures 
as people left, rejoined and then decided to leave once again in the space of a few years. The figures 
may also owe much to the completion of the national membership system in 1991 and a subsequent 
correction of inaccurate constituency based records. Some members may have been genuinely ‘lost’ 
in the transition to the new system. Nevertheless the scale of the haemorrhage is manifest. A party 
report in 1993 indicated that Labour had only 90,000 fully-paid up members and a retention rate of 
50 per cent over a three year period (Routledge 1993). The collapse in membership continued into 
1994: only around 250,000 papers were issued for the leadership contest in July that year. A 
considerable proportion of the rise in membership after 1994 simply reflected the recovery of 
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Figure 2 Annual Change in Labour Party Membership, 1991-2011 
 
Source: Labour party NEC, Annual Report, 1991-2011; Electoral Commission 2011. 
 
A second feature of table 1 concerns the relentless and persistent collapse after the successes of 
1994-97. Unlike the fluctuations before 1997, individual party membership fell for twelve successive 
years from its peak in that year. Within this trend, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 does not seem 
to have had a dramatic effect. Membership fell by 13.4 per cent in that year (the invasion was in 
March) but other years such as 2000 and 2001 – before the intervention in Iraq - were as marked in 
their decline. Some of the fall in 2000 can be attributed to a change in the method of calculation 
(members in long-term arrears were no longer included). Two years in which the rate of decline was 
relatively low were 2005 and 2007. The former may reflect the impact of the general election, the 
latter the deputy leadership contest within the party - both of which may have generated increased 
political activity and engagement (though this did not happen in another general election year, 
2001).  
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Support for such an interpretation is to be found from Whiteley and Seyd (2002, 127 and 165). 
Looking at those who had exited the party in the late 1990s, they found them more likely to be 
inactive and weakly attached to Labour than other members. Such attributes were characteristic of 
new members close to the spirit of New Labour. A subsequent survey of ex-members, conducted by 
Paul Whiteley, found steady figures for the date at which people had left the party. Over a quarter of 
respondents had left during 2001-2005, representing over 6 per cent a year of the total of those who 
had left the party. But for each year between 1997 and 2001, the figure was around 5 per cent of 
those who were surveyed (Whiteley 2009, 249). Further, qualitative evidence to back this analysis is 
to be found in Ann Black’s reports of NEC discussions on the topic. She noted, ‘Three members leave 
for each one who joins, though most are thought to lapse rather than actively resigning. We do not 
know if boring meetings or policy disagreements are the main cause and we should find out before 
they go’ (Black, 25-26 November 2002). A few months later David Triesman, Labour’s general 
secretary, argued that lapsed subscriptions were a major cause of declining membership: such 
individuals could often be persuaded to renew (Black, 25 March 2003). Until April 2003, active 
resignations were outnumbered by new recruits (Black, 3-4 November 2003). Earlier, The 
Independent quoted a party official, ‘It is no secret that it is easier to recruit members as an 
opposition fighting a deeply unpopular government in the run-up to an election than it is when you 
have high satisfaction ratings in the polls and people seem happy with the government’ (Smith 2000, 
8; see also Baldwin 2002). Triesman told The Scotsman, ‘One of the things about political parties is 
they are not all ruthlessly efficient machines in the way that is sometimes supposed. Quite often 
people join. They are not pursued at the end of the first year to pay again and they drift out’ (Innes 
2002, 9). Anecdotal information suggested people had joined to help eject the Conservative 
government. Almost as soon as that had been achieved, as early as June 1997, a survey of Scottish 
members found that 19 per cent ‘felt they derived little or nothing from their membership (Bond 
1999). To be sure, ideological differences over such matters as Iraq, public service reform, and 
university tuition fees, are likely to have played a part in the collapse of Labour’s membership in this 
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period. But declining numbers also reflected the realities of office after the enthusiasm of 
opposition, changes in dealing with arrears, and inefficiency on the part of the party. The flow of the 
decline and the evidence collected by Whiteley and Seyd indicates that Labour simply experienced 
considerable difficulty in holding onto members it had recruited so energetically in the 1990s.  
Whiteley (2009, 248) noted that by 2008, for every Labour party member there were 2.3 ex-
members (the equivalent ratio for the Conservatives was 1.9). 
 
Third, as noted above for 1991-1993, the net figures in later years are likely to hide more dramatic 
shifts. The only recent year for which the full data is available is 2008. The net decline in this year 
was just over 10,000, a figure offset by over 12,000 new members joining up. Over 14.0 per cent of 
members left the party in 2008, the first full year of Gordon Brown’s premiership. 
 
A last feature concerns the fluctuation in membership since May 2010. Proportionately, the year 
with the greatest increase in membership did not come under Tony Blair’s leadership of Labour but 
following the 2010 general election defeat. Individual membership of the party rose by nearly 25 per 
cent in a single year. In 2011, the party leadership claimed 65,000 new members since the May 2010 
general election. This figure indicated that it was likely that a third or more of the party’s 
membership was newly recruited (though, of course, some of those to leave may have done so after 
only one year’s membership). Equally striking is the 178,005 figure given by Ann Black for the 
distribution of membership ballots for NEC and internal elections in 2012. These ballots were 
distributed between 25 and 29 May 2012. If accurate, Black’s figure would indicate a decline of 8.6 
per cent in less than five months of that year putting the party’s membership at virtually the number 
of ballots distributed for the 2010 leadership contest. At an annual rate such a decline would take 
the party back, by the end of 2012, pretty much to where it was in December 2009 before the 2010 
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general election (the figure for 2012 will be published in the summer of 2013). Overall, table 1 
makes apparent the scale of Labour’s organisational crisis over most of the last twenty years in 
terms both of the overall decline of membership and of the volatility of the figures. 
 
The experience of Sedgefield and Dunfermline mirrored the decline in national party membership.  
As noted above, in terms of recruiting new members during the 1990s, the two constituencies 
appeared to lead the way. Both were pivotal in pioneering a number of techniques to boost 
recruitment and in mapping out the model of a mass party. By August 1993, Sedgefield’s 
membership was at 2,000 (Hetherington, 1994). Dunfermline’s membership had also increased 
dramatically (Sherman, 1993). Having already doubled, the constituency party set itself a goal of 
1,500 by October 1993 (Jones 1993). By the autumn of 1995, one newspaper reported that it was 
the fourth largest CLP in Scotland (behind three constituencies with well established social clubs; 
Dawson 1995). But the success of Sedgefield and Dunfermline East was not sustained. The Guardian 
reported in May 2003 that Sedgefield had lost over half its members in six years and was down to 
around 900. Interestingly, it stated that the £1 rate, by which members paid a token amount and 
had been held up as fundamental to getting people to join, had been dropped. It had proved too 
expensive to offset through the kind of fundraising that had attracted so much press attention in the 
mid-1990s (Maguire 2003, 8). When faced with the option of paying the full amount, individuals had 
left the party. It was such financial logistics that were blamed for the fall in membership rather than 
contentious political choices on the part of the government, such as intervention in Iraq. Earlier, at 
the outset of the initiative to raise membership, one newspaper article had stated that Dunfermline 
East would be unable to make up the difference in contributions through fundraising (Sherman 
1993). A low membership fee was therefore not a viable strategy. Another report identified apathy 
as the ‘main problem’ behind falling membership in Sedgefield (Grice 1999, 3). Elsewhere Andrew 
Pierce identified a degree of disenchantment with New Labour’s policies as a factor alongside a 
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more general lack of interest (Pierce 2000). The end result was that by the time of the 2010 Labour 
leadership contest the membership of both constituencies was a fraction of what it had once been. 
In both cases the fall was larger than that of the party’s membership as a whole. Sedgefield lost 
around 80 per cent of its members; Dunfermline East something like 70 per cent of its membership, 
being now only the 20th largest CLP in Scotland. In July 2010, Trimdon Labour Club, one of the 
centrepieces of Blair’s community-based party, closed as a result of lack of business (Lloyd 2010, 12). 
 
IV Labour party membership at the 2010 leadership contest 
At the time of the 2010 Labour leadership contest, the number of party members had risen by over 
20,000 from around 156,000 at the end of 2009 as individuals joined following the interest 
generated by the general election (some being disaffected Liberal Democrats) and by the intense 
battle for the party leadership (in which new recruits could vote). The total reported for 2009 was 
the lowest ever recorded by the party but it seems likely that membership had bottomed out in the 
months before the general election at an even lower figure of around 150,000, an historic low.  
 
Table 2 details the shift in the size of constituency parties between 1993 and 2010. At the start of 
this period well over one hundred had a base of over 500 members. By 2010, the number had 
dwindled to just 54. In 1998 after the success of the initiative to recruit members, 50 CLPs had 
memberships of over 1,000 (McSmith 1998); by 2010 there were just four, all in London. Banff and 
Buchan had just 43 members. On average each constituency had 279 members. Whilst only 13 CLPs 
had less than 100 members, well over 200, over a third of local parties had less than a membership 
of under 200 (astonishingly, 25 of these had a Labour MP). Across the country, therefore, many local 
parties had been reduced to a rump.  
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Table 2: Size of Constituency Labour Parties 
 1993 2010 
No. % No. % 
500+ 132 21 54 9 
300-500 285 45 146 23 
Under 300 217 34 432 68 
Source: Brown 1993; Labour party 2010 
 
 
Table 3 details the regional distribution of Labour party membership in 2010. Figures taken from 
Seyd and Whiteley allow a contrast with 1990. The comparison is not exact as Seyd and Whiteley’s 
definition of the regions is slightly different from the one we have used (taken from the BBC). The 
broad trends are interesting, however. The most notable feature of the table is that over a fifth of 
Labour’s membership now comes from London. In fact, well over half of the CLPs with more than 
500 members in 2010 (34 out of 54) were in the capital. Wales did not have a single constituency 
party with a membership of more than 500; Scotland just two. At the other end of the spectrum to 
London, the data indicates the utter paucity of Labour’s membership in Scotland. Just before Blair 
became leader each CLP in Scotland had, on average, 283 members (Routledge 1993). By 2010 that 
figure had fallen to 223. It is striking that many of the constituency parties outside London with 
memberships over 500 are either home to or close by traditional established universities. Around 14 
of these 20 CLPs had close links to old universities (another two to newer establishments). Outside 
of the capital, Labour membership may be heavily shaped by access to a student and university staff 
population. 
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Table 3: regional distribution of Labour party members and Labour voters, 1990 and 2010. 








Members % Voters % Ratio of 
members to 
voters 
London >12 10-11 >1.25 21 14 1.4 
South-east 10-11 <7 >1.25 10 8 1.3 
Southwest <7 <7 >1.25 6 5 1.2 
East of England 8-9 <7 >1.25 8 7 1.2 
West Midlands 8-9 10-11 0.75-1.00 8 9 0.8 
East Midlands <7 <7 1.00-1.25 7 8 0.9 
Wales <7 8-9 0.75-1.00 6 6 1.0 
Yorkshire & The 
Humber 
8-9 10-11 <0.75 9 10 0.9 
North-West >12 >12 0.75-1.00 12 15 0.8 
North-East <7 <7 0.75-1.00 6 6 0.9 
Scotland 8-9 >12 <0.75 7 12 0.6 
Totals 100 100 1 100 100 1 
Sources: Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 29-31; Labour party 2010 
 
By 2010 there was considerable variation in the size of CLPs both across the regions and according to 
incumbency. London CLPs were much bigger than any others. Labour held seats were double the size 
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of those in six of the other regions. Even non-Labour constituencies in London were, on average, 
bigger than Labour constituencies in any of the other regions. Figures generated by Justin Fisher 
from a survey by David Denver and Gordon Hands allow a comparison with 1997, at the height of 
New Labour, and this data is set out in Table 4 (Fisher 2000: Denver and Hands 1998). Overall, the 
average CLP declined in size by 53 per cent. The regional pattern is much the same in both years: 
London dominated in 1997 as it did in 2010; CLPs in Scotland were notably small in both years. 
Variations in the ranking of regions according to overall average CLP size within that range are not 
significant except for the East of England, down from 3rd  to 7th. However, we note that the collapse 
in CLP size is generally more pronounced in the South (outside London) and in the Midlands. Thus 
membership has tended to decline by more since 1997 in the areas targeted by New Labour in 
broadening its appeal, and in which the party performed badly at the general elections of 2005 and 
2010. 
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Table 4: Average size of CLPs by region and incumbency  









size of CLP in 
2010 (ranking)  
Overall average 






London 622 359 496 (1st) 930 (1st) -47% 
South-East 489 210 224 (9) 524 (8) -57% 
South-West 303 189 197 (11) 513 (9) -62% 
East of England 585 222 235 (7) 628 (3) -63% 
West Midlands 275 201 231 (8) 495 (10) -53% 
East Midlands 341 221 260 (6) 601 (6) -57% 
Wales 312 218 279 (5) 582 (7) -52% 
Yorkshire and 
Humber 
307 262 289 (4) 612 (5) 
-53% 
North West 307 262 290 (3) 625 (4) -54% 
North-East 356 243 340 (2) 662 (2) -49% 
Scotland 266 124 223 (10) 385 (11) -42% 
Overall 356 226 279 591 -53% 
Source: for 2010, Labour party 2010; for 1997, Fisher 2000, 145 
 
A straightforward consequence of London’s domination of the regional distribution of individual 
membership can be seen in the results of elections to the party’s National Executive Committee. 
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Division III of Labour’s NEC is made up of six constituency party representatives elected for a two 
year term. Half those elected must be women and candidates cannot be members of the House of 
Commons (or other national assemblies) or the House of Lords. In 2010 there were 20 candidates. 
Nine were from London (and two others had strong links to the capital). There were no nominations 
from the North-East, South-West, and Wales. Five out of the six elected were either from London or 
(in the case of one) had been based in the capital until very recently.  The sixth, Ann Black, lives in 
Oxford, only sixty miles from London. In November 2010 when Oona King was appointed to the 
Lords, she was replaced by Joanna Baxter, also from London.  In 2012 the pattern was similar. Of the 
six successful candidates, four were from the capital (or in the case of one had a close link to it). Ann 
Black was re-elected from Oxford. Peter Wheeler was elected from Salford. Seven of the thirteen 
unsuccessful candidates were from London.  
 
V Members and votes 
In the early 1990s, Seyd and Whiteley identified a link between Labour’s individual membership and 
the party’s general election vote (see especially Whiteley and Seyd 1992). There were a number of 
ways of exploring this link and any the correlation between the two variables was not 
straightforward. Causality was potentially problematic: votes might shape membership levels but, 
equally, both might be dependent on any one of a number of other variables such as housing, 
unemployment and so forth. Clearly both votes and memberships were likely to be shaped by a 
historical trajectory. Moreover, the exact causal relationship as to how membership might shape 
votes was not specified in some of the models. Nevertheless, the Seyd and Whiteley analysis, 
building on survey data, generated a powerful argument that in some sense members shaped 
Labour’s vote at general elections.  
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In their discussion of the 1987 general election Seyd and Whiteley presented an interesting 
comparison between the size of individual CLPs and the party’s vote that year. Their conclusion was 
direct: smaller CLPs were associated with Labour getting a lower share of the vote. Table 5 allows us 
to make a direct comparison between 1987 and 2010. We see in 2010, as in 1987, that small CLPs 
are associated with a low vote; conversely large CLPs are more associated with a high vote. The 
relationship has become slightly more pronounced: more seats which have a low grassroots base do 
badly in terms of achieving a vote under 20 per cent. In the context of a pronounced shift towards 
smaller CLPs this development signals a major concern for Labour. 
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Table 5: Relationship between CLP size and the Labour vote, 1987 and 2010 
 
Number of members 
 
Percentage of the constituency vote in 1987 
 <20 20-30 30-40 >=40 Total 
Under 180 62 10 6 22 100 
180-360 36 20 12 33 101 
360-540 12 20 16 53 101 
Over 540 4 16 19 61 100 
All CLPs 34 17 12 38 101 
 
Number of members 
 
Percentage of the constituency vote in 2010 
 <20 20-30 30-40 >=40 Total 
Under 180 76 12 6 6 100 
180-360 22 13 31 35 100 
360-540 6 11 28 54 100 
Over 540 0 10 13 77 100 
All CLPs 32 12 23 33 100 
Source: Seyd and Whiteley 1992, 185; Labour party 2010 and 2010 general election data 
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Recent scholarship challenges some aspects of the Seyd and Whiteley model (see the discussion in 
Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006). The data in table 6 below contests the notion of a linear 
relationship between members and votes (though it is based on the relationship between 
membership and the size of electoral majorities). Fisher, Denver and Hands argue that centralised 
interventions by party bureaucracies matter more than localised memberships. On the basis of the 
data available to us at the time of the 2010 Labour leadership we cannot resolve this issue, though 
the construction of a variable to capture centralised intervention is problematic. We can state that 
the relationship between electoral votes and local Labour memberships currently looks very similar 
to that originally posited by Seyd and Whiteley (without necessarily drawing the same causal 
inference that they do). Labour’s performance at the 2010 general election may well have been 
shaped by strategic interventions: it was certainly characterised by a link between falling 
membership and declining votes on a constituency by constituency basis. 
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Table 6: Average size of Labour CLP according to marginality 
 All Very safe Comfortable Marginal Possible Hopeless 













1992 444 483 558 577 504 348 
1997 592 669 602 765 575 474 
2010 279 367 351 298 268 197 
% decline 
1997-2010 
53% 45% 42% 61% 53% 59% 
2010 n= 631 115 64 190 47 215 
Source: 1992 & 1997 Denver and Hands (1997), pp. 77-78; data for 2010 is our analysis of Labour 
party (2010) in conjunction with returns for the 2010 general election. 
Note that 2010 n=631 due to the exclusion of the Speaker’s seat. 
 
Table 6 illustrates Denver and Hands’ alternative view of the relationship between party 
membership and votes: here the average size of CLPs is broken down by the marginality of the seat 
over three general elections. (The seats will change across elections, of course, but then so too do 
many local memberships.) Taken in 1992 and 1997, Denver and Hands’ data differed from Seyd and 
Whiteley by suggesting that membership levels might stall in safe and comfortable seats. By 
contrast, it was likely to be higher in marginal seats. The data from 2010 demonstrates that the most 
serious decline in membership since 1997 has occurred in marginal seats. As a result, there is now a 
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clear linear relationship, with average constituency size falling away as we move from ‘very safe’ to 
‘hopeless’ constituencies. At the latter end of the scale, we see 215 ‘hopeless’ seats with an average 
number of members less than 200. The data from 2010 thus broadly confirms the Seyd and Whiteley 
model established in the early 1990s: higher constituency membership is associated with a higher 
election vote. It also confirms our conclusion that Labour’s membership crisis is not simply linked to 
partisan disaffection driving individuals out of the party: far from it, the decline has been more 
marked in marginal, possible and hopeless seats, the kind of constituencies targeted by New Labour 
in the mid-1990s. It has been less pronounced in Labour’s heartlands. Again, this finding bodes ill for 
Labour in the context of its collapsing membership. The net result is that, of 405 marginal 
constituencies where the MP had less than a five percentage point lead in 2010, Labour had a CLP 
membership of less than 200 in nearly half (195). Of those, 13 had a membership of under a hundred 
and 63 of between 100 and 150. Moreover, a large constituency membership is no guarantee of 
electoral success: in March 2012 Labour lost the Bradford West by-election to George Galloway’s 
Respect Party candidature.  The constituency had the 15th largest Labour party membership outside 
of London. 
 
The data in Table 7 give a sense of fluctuations in the number of votes per member of the party at a 
general election. It is noteworthy that the two extremes - the most votes per member and the least - 
came in the two worst general election performances, 1983 and 2010 respectively. However, what is 
also striking is the huge shift in the ratio of voters to Labour members, as individuals have left the 
party. In 1997 there had been just over 100 voters for every Labour member. By 2010, that figure 
had nearly tripled. Overall, the decline in Labour membership to a low point of around 150,000 at 
the time of the 2010 general election raises question marks about the capacity of the party’s 
grassroots to represent Labour in the wider community. 
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Table 7; Labour party membership in proportion to the electorate and 
Labour voters, general elections, 1983-2010 
 Members No on electoral roll 
per member 
No of Labour 
voters per member 
1983 273,803 154 31 
1987 297,364 145 34 
1992 261,233 166 44 
1997 400, 465 109 34 
2001 311,000 143 34 
2005 201,374 220 47 
2010 156,205 292 55 
Note: membership given in December of preceding year.  




In this article, we have examined the current state of Labour’s grassroots in the context of the 
experience of the last twenty years or so, which saw an initial rise in membership followed by a 
period of steady decline. What have been the key determinants of the fluctuations in Labour’s 
membership? On the basis of the flow of members tracked by party statistics, we conclude that 
alignment related to partisan issues does not provide a complete explanation of the fall in Labour’s 
membership. Certainly, there was a decline associated with the decision to invade Iraq. But the drop 
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began well before the date of the invasion and was remarkably steady. We do not have survey 
evidence to explore this issue further. However it is quite likely that such data would fail to capture 
fully the reasons why people leave a party: respondents would be likely to exaggerate the principled 
basis of their motivations. In our judgement fluctuations in membership are linked as much to the 
political context as they are to particular party policies or political alignments. There is some 
evidence that a lower membership fee can encourage supporters to join the party - a 1p rate 
attracted 3,000 youth members in 2010 (NEC, 2011a, 31) - but generally new members join in 
response to opportunities to participate (such as internal elections) and enhanced political debate 
(unpopular governments, general elections). They drift away in response to limited opportunities, an 
uncertain role, and/or the compromises that being in government entail. This raises some doubts 
about the emphasis placed on incentives by Seyd and Whiteley in their earlier analysis of the 
decision to join the party. They conclude that ‘the decline of membership can be turned around with 
the right incentives’ (Seyd and Whiteley, 2004, 357). Provided parties offer ‘a range of these 
incentives they can still attract members’ (Seyd and Whiteley, 2004, 365). Retaining Labour party 
members since 1997 has required more than incentives to the extent that the basic range of 
inducements remained much the same over the period. By contrast, the political context altered and 
members drifted away. Without rejecting motivations and party strategy, we suggest that the 
political environment plays a major role in shaping Labour membership fluctuations. 
 
Does the reduction in the number of Labour members matter for the party’s fortunes (see the 
general discussion in Scarrow, 2000; and Seyd and Whiteley, 2004)? Members can provide 
significant resources to a party, most obviously in the form of financial support. They act as a pool 
from which office holders in the and in external party positions can be recruited party (around one 
member in fifteen held a party office in 2012 according to NEC, 2012). They represent parties in the 
community, generating legitimacy, and they may play a part in campaigning at general and other 
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elections.  Equally though, it is arguable just how significant is the kind of decline identified in this 
article. Other parties too have lost members – though not proportionately as many as Labour. 
Modern elections are centralised, frequently dominated by elites and by national campaigning. 
Members may not be needed to provide political ballast in the way that they were in the 1990s at 
the launch of New Labour (in the face of more extreme activists). Scarrow and Gezgor (2010) 
concluded that parties may become more representative of the community as membership levels 
fall. In terms of broad attributes – age, race and gender – there is some evidence that Labour now 
confirms this trend (NEC, 2011a, 31). In terms of political attributes, such as policy positions and 
ideological outlook, it seems less certain: as the evidence in this article indicates, people are less 
likely to leave in Labour’s traditional heartland but, of course, the available data does not confirm 
one way or the other; and recent data suggest that the present party membership is considerably to 
the left of the voters the party has lost since 1997 (Kellner, 2012). Scarrow’s earlier work noted the 
possibility that membership might fail to represent a party geographically: ‘another measure of a 
party’s grassroots strength is the extent of its organisation throughout all parts of the country’ 
(2000, 97). From the data in table 4, Labour looks extremely weak on such an indicator with average 
local party sizes of around 200 or less in non-incumbent constituencies in the South-East, South-
West, West Midlands and Scotland. Moribund CLPs in marginal seats is an issue. The trend is for the 
ratio of Labour members to Labour voters to increase as membership declines, making such 
members increasingly unusual in their communities.  
 
At the same time, the Labour leadership has persisted in emphasising the importance of 
membership recruitment and a healthy grassroots, despite the failure of these repeated initiatives. 
In the aftermath of the 2010 electoral defeat, it launched the ‘Refounding Labour’ project to 
energise the party and enrol new members (Labour party 2011). But many of the initiatives it 
emphasised to help recruitment were not new: restructured meetings, social gatherings, revised fee 
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structures, and community links had all been features of Tony Blair’s New Labour model. The 
experience of that earlier initiatives suggests it is unlikely that such revised incentives alone will 
enable parties to retain newly-joined members.  Moreover, some leading figures within the party 
appear unwilling to acknowledge the extent of the party’s grassroots crisis: James Purnell (2012, 94) 
claims, ‘Today Labour is full of active parties (as well as a few in need of defibrillators).’ The data 
marshalled here suggests such an attitude to be complacent. 
 
What does this discussion indicate more generally concerning party membership? The comparative 
literature has done a good job in terms of tracking the variations in membership levels. However, we 
note a significant general issue arising from these analyses. Have authors working in this field paid 
sufficient attention to the ‘revolving door’ of membership?  Much of the analysis tends to conclude 
that there has been a straightforward decline with parties unable to recruit new members. Thus, van 
Biezen et al write that parties have failed ‘to recruit new members in significant numbers’ (2012, 25). 
In as much as the data allows us to judge, Labour has proved effective at recruiting new members. It 
has simply lost members in even greater numbers. Even in the two years following the invasion of 
Iraq, Labour enlisted something like 25,000 individuals (some of whom may well have left and 
rejoined within that period – see Black, 1-2 November 2004).  The velocity with which membership 
has gone up and down suggests to us that in many cases members are joining, leaving and rejoining 
on a cyclical basis, thus generating our ‘revolving door’ metaphor.  Accordingly, on the basis of this 
data, we ask whether the comparative literature has given sufficient attention to the retention of 
members, once they have been recruited. 
 
Our analysis of membership trends within the Labour party, just one case to be sure, appears to be 
at odds with the findings generated by Paul Whiteley (2010). His statistical model indicates that state 
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interventions have smothered party activity thus provoking falls in membership. With regard to 
Labour, the party has centralised many of its activities and organisational practices but it is not clear 
that such interventions can explain the withering of its grassroots. Such centralisations have not 
been linked to state activities. At the very least, if leaders have deliberately incited the decline such 
an approach seems to be at odds with the importance that they have also placed and continued to 
place on recruiting members and sustaining the party’s grassroots. If Labour leaders knew a 
declining membership would result from party centralisation, it must be explained why they have 
placed so much public emphasis on attempts to revive local participation. Labour elites have not 
been ‘relatively unconcerned’ about membership levels as van Biezen et al indicate parties to be 
(2012, 40). Their attempts to boost recruitment have often succeeded: they have failed in retention.  
Thus the sustained attempt to revive Labour’s grassroots must be seen as a failure: yet the party’s 
current leadership continues to emphasise such a development. We conclude the political 
environment and contextual factors to play an important part in this pattern. 
 
The precarious state of the party’s membership overall and of many local CLPs in particular is patent. 
Labour’s membership currently is metropolitan and centralised in terms of its domination from 
London. Across the country as a whole, by the time of the 2010 general election the party appeared 
in many of its CLPs to have been reduced to a rump of committed activists and inert members. With 
memberships of under 200 in some Labour held seats and low turnouts, the number of activists 
choosing the party’s parliamentary candidates may be very low; raising the possibility either of 
systematic entryism or irregular contests involving paper memberships. Quite what this state of 
affairs means for the future organisation and indeed for the ownership of Labour is unclear. Parties 
are resilient. They can develop and they can adapt. But a sustained revival of grassroots membership 
levels does not appear likely to occur. Labour may have to look to an alternative model as the basis 
of its future activities. There are of course many potential alternatives available with differing roles 
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for members alike. But the emphasis placed by the leadership currently on membership recruitment 
suggests that Labour has not developed a coherent and sustainable model.  On the basis of the data 




We are extremely grateful to the journal’s anonymous referees and to Steve Kettell for their helpful 
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